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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
The Joint Stock Society ("Joint Stock") and the Russian 
American Spirits Company ("RASCO"), filed this action 
against UDV North America, Inc. ("UDV") and the Pierre 
Smirnoff Company, asserting claims under the Lanham Act, 
15 U.S.C. S 1051 et seq., for false designation of origin, 
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false advertising, and trademark cancellation. The plaintiffs 
also raised claims under the Delaware Uniform Deceptive 
Trade Practices Act, 6 Del. Code SS 2531-36 et seq. The 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants have fostered the 
mistaken impression that Smirnoff vodka is made in Russia 
and is the same product that was produced in Russia and 
sold to the czar before the Russian Revolution. The District 
Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to present 
a case or controversy that was ripe for decision within the 
meaning of Article III of the United States Constitution and 
that, even if the plaintiffs' claims were ripe, the plaintiffs 
did not meet constitutional or prudential standing 
requirements. In the alternative, the Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants under the 
doctrine of laches. See Joint Stock Soc'y v. UDV N. Am., Inc., 
53 F. Supp. 2d 692 (D. Del. 1999). We hold that the 
plaintiffs did not satisfy Article III or prudential standing 





In the 1860s, Piotr Arsenvitch Smirnov ("P.A. Smirnov") 
began a vodka trade house in Russia named "P.A. Smirnov 
in Moscow." During his lifetime, P.A. Smirnov built his 
trade house into a nationally and internationally renowned 
vodka distillery, winning numerous awards. Perhaps the 
greatest recognition he received was being named the 
"Official Purveyor to the Russian Imperial Court" in 1886. 
 
P.A. Smirnov died in 1898, leaving the trade house to his 
widow and five sons. After his widow died in 1899, the 
business was owned by his sons, who were, from eldest to 
youngest, Piotr, Nikolai, Vladimir, Sergei, and Alexey. The 
plaintiffs allege that the three oldest brothers bought 
Sergei's and Alexey's interests in the business in 1902. 
Plaintiffs also allege that Nikolai and Vladimir sold their 
interests to Piotr in 1904 or 1905, leaving Piotr as the sole 
owner of the trade house. In addition, the plaintiffs claim 
that Vladimir agreed to relinquish his "right to the company 
name, privileges, and honors" in exchange for monetary 
compensation. When Piotr died in 1910, his wife, Eugenia, 
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became the sole owner of the trade house. She operated the 
trade house successfully until 1917. 
 
In 1917, as the Bolshevik revolution spread through 
Russia, Eugenia married an Italian diplomat and fled to 
Italy. She eventually settled in Nice, France. In 1918, the 
newly formed Communist government in Russia 
nationalized the Smirnov trade house. Under state control, 
the trade house no longer used the "Smirnov" name, 
although vodka production continued. 
 
Also in flight from the Russian Revolution, Vladimir 
relocated to Constantinople. In 1920, he established a 
distillery under the name "Supplier to the Imperial Russian 
Court, Pierre Smirnoff Sons." By 1924, Vladimir had moved 
to Lvov, Poland, and had opened a vodka distillery. In 1925, 
he opened another distillery in Paris under the name of 
"Ste. Pierre Smirnoff Fils" or "The Company of the Sons of 
Peter Smirnoff." 
 
In 1933, Ste. Pierre Smirnoff Fls. entered into an 
agreement with Rudolph Kunett, an American 
businessman. Under this agreement, Vladimir granted 
Kunett the exclusive right to manufacture and market 
Smirnoff vodka in the United States in exchange for 
monetary compensation. Kunett soon thereafter assigned 
his rights to himself, Benjamin B. McAlpin, Jr., Donald M. 
McAlpin, and Townsend M. McAlpin. Those four 
individuals, in turn, assigned their rights to a newly created 
New York corporation, Ste. Pierre Smirnoff Fls., Inc. (NY). In 
1934, Ste. Pierre Smirnoff Fls., Inc. (NY) began the 
production and sales of vodka in the United States, using 
the name of "Smirnoff "1 and the historical Smirnoff marks.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. As the parties concede, there is no material difference between the 
"Smirnoff " and "Smirnov" names. However, in order to differentiate 
between the parties and their respective products, we use the name 
"Smirnov" when referring to the plaintiffs' products and Smirnoff when 
referring to those made by the defendants. 
 
2. The historical marks of which Joint Stock complains include, but are 
not limited to, the use of Cyrillic characters, a crown, a shield and red 
shroud from the Russian Imperial Court, and several medals bearing the 
state coat of arms for Russia. 
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Five years later, G.F. Heublein & Bro. purchased Ste. 
Pierre Smirnoff, Fls., Inc. (NY). G.F. Heublein & Bro. 
established a Connecticut subsidiary to manufacture and 
market the sale of Smirnoff vodka in the United States, Ste. 
Pierre Smirnoff, Fls. (CT). In 1955, G.F. Heublein & Bro. 
changed its name to Heublein, Inc. Since then, Heublein 
and its successor, UDV, have marketed Smirnoff vodka 
successfully, currently manufacturing approximately six 
million cases per year. Smirnoff is now the largest-selling 
vodka brand in the United States and the second largest- 
selling distilled spirit. Smirnoff still uses labeling and 
advertising that is heavily dependent on its association with 
P.A. Smirnov and the Russian trade house. For example, 
the label of a Smirnoff vodka bottle refers to Ste. Pierre 
Smirnoff Fls. as "Purveyors to the Imperial Russian Court 
1886-1917" and "successors to the world-famous Pierre 
Smirnoff." The label also includes a crown, shield, and red 
shrouds from the Russian Imperial Court, as well as several 
medals bearing the state coats of arms for Russia. 
 
Eugenia first learned of Vladimir's use of the Smirnoff 
name and marks around 1925. Upset that Vladimir was 
marketing Smirnoff vodka without permission, she wrote a 
letter to her husband asking for advice. Her husband 
responded that any legal action would require documentary 
proof of her claim to be the sole owner of the Smirnov trade 
house. However, all papers proving the ownership of the 
trade house were still in Russia, where the Communist 
regime was repressing all facets of private enterprise. 
Fearing that she would be prosecuted by the Soviet 
authorities if she tried to obtain the needed documents in 
Russia, Eugenia elected not to make an attempt. She did, 
however, write letters to friends and family in Russia asking 
for their help. Eugenia also had her daughter, Tatyana, 
write letters to friends, relatives, and organizations to enlist 
their aid in obtaining documentary proof, but there is no 
evidence that either Eugenia or Tatyana contacted Vladimir 
to bring this issue to his attention. 
 
During the 1930s, Eugenia and her family became aware 
that Vladimir had sold his "rights" to the Smirnoff name to 
Kunett and that Kunett was manufacturing Smirnoff vodka 
in the United States and was using the Smirnoff name and 
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marks. Nevertheless, no one contacted either Kunett or the 
later producers of Smirnoff vodka in America, Ste. Pierre 
Smirnoff Fls. Inc. (NY), to inform them of Eugenia's claim to 
the Smirnoff name. 
 
In 1958, Eugenia died. Prior to her death, however, 
Eugenia executed a document giving Tatyana "power of 
attorney" over the "defense of [her] interest in asserting 
[her] rights to the ownership and title of`SMIRNOFF 
VODKA' . . . which [she believed had] been unjustly used by 
third parties in violation of her rights." In 1977, Tatyana 
died intestate in France, with her "rights" in Smirnoff 
passing to her sons, Boris Alexandrovich Smirnoff and 
George Smirnoff. George Smirnoff died the next year, never 
having informed Heublein of his claim to the rights 
surrounding the name "Smirnoff." Nor did Boris 
Alexandrovich Smirnoff ever inform Heublein of his claim 





As noted, the plaintiffs-appellants in this case are Joint 
Stock and RASCO. Neither of the plaintiffs has a direct 
connection to Eugenia, Tatyana, Boris Alexandrovich, or 
George (collectively, the "French Smirnovs"). Instead, both 
are recently formed companies that wish to import and sell 
vodka in the United States under the Smirnov name. 
 
Joint Stock was chartered in Russia in 1993 as "Trade 
House of Descendants of Peter Smirnov, Official Purveyor to 
the Imperial Court." The principal owners of Joint Stock are 
Andrei and Boris Alexeseevich Smirnoff (as distinguished 
from Boris Alexandrovitch Smirnoff, Eugenia's son), who are 
the descendants of P.A. Smirnov's two youngest sons, 
Sergei and Alexey. Joint Stock, in conjunction with Russian 
vodka manufacturers, currently produces and markets 
vodka under the Smirnov name in Russia. 
 
RASCO is a Delaware corporation headquartered in 
Connecticut. RASCO has an agreement with Joint Stock 
under which RASCO would be the exclusive licensee for any 
rights Joint Stock might obtain in the Smirnoff or Smirnov 
trademark and trade name. RASCO was incorporated by an 
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agent of Joint Stock with this purpose in mind. Neither 
Joint Stock nor RASCO has ever sold vodka in the United 
States. 
 
The defendants-appellees in this case are UDV and the 
Pierre Smirnoff Company. As detailed above, UDV, a 
Connecticut corporation, and its predecessors have 
manufactured, sold, distributed, and marketed the Smirnoff 
brand of vodka products in the United States since 1934. 
Between 1934 and 1997, UDV and its predecessors 
obtained 17 trademark registrations in the United States 
for various Smirnoff marks. The Pierre Smirnoff Company, 
a Delaware Corporation, is the wholly owned subsidiary of 
UDV responsible for the marketing of Smirnoff vodka. The 
defendants and their predecessors heavily promoted the 
Smirnoff brand, spending more than $700 million for 
advertising and marketing over the past 60 years. 
 
The plaintiffs in this case contend that the defendants 
have misappropriated the Smirnov name and that they 
have misled consumers into believing that Smirnoff vodka 
is made in Russia and is the same as the product that was 
produced in Russia and purveyed to the czar before the 
revolution. In fact, they allege that Smirnoff vodka is made 
in the United States using ingredients and a process that 
sharply differ from that used in Russia before 1917. Instead 
of pure Russian water, they say, Smirnoff uses filtered city 
tap water, and instead of neutral spirits derived from 
Russian wheat, Smirnoff is made using American corn. 
Moreover, the date 1818 on the Smirnoff label, according to 
the plaintiffs, is deceptive, since the Russian trade house 
was not founded until 1860, and manufacture of the 
distinctive American vodka sold under the Smirnoff mark 
did not commence until the 1930s. 
 
The complaint in this action contained seven counts. 
Counts one and two asserted claims for, respectively, false 
designation of origin and false advertising, in violation of 
Section 43(a)(1)(A) and (B) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 
SS 1125(a)(1)(A) and (B).3 In support of these claims, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Section 43(a)(1)(A) and (B) provide as follows: 
 
       (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, 
       or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, 
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complaint referred to the defendants' use of "the trademark 
and trade name SMIRNOFF " and "the Smirnoff family 
crest, insignia, emblems, and medals." Counts one and two 
alleged that the defendants' false designation of the origin 
of their products and false advertising had caused damage 
to the plaintiffs and was likely to continue to do so. It is 
important to note that, although the plaintiffs' presentation 
of their position often tends to foster a contrary impression, 
these claims under Section 43(a) are not dependent on any 
right that the plaintiffs may assert to the use of the 
Smirnov or Smirnoff name. As plaintiffs' counsel 
acknowledged at oral argument, the plaintiffs could have 
asserted these claims even if they marketed their product 
under a wholly unrelated name. The essence of these 
claims is not that the defendants have no legitimate right to 
the use of the Smirnoff marks but that the defendants have 
propagated the false impression that Smirnoff vodka is 
Russian and is essentially the same product that was 
produced by P.A. Smirnov in czarist days. As the Second 
Circuit stated, "Section 43(a) is intended to reach false 
advertising violations, not false registration claims." La 
Societe Anonyme des Parfums Le Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 
495 F.2d 1265, 1271 n.6 (2nd Cir. 1974); see also Charles 
E. McKenney & George F. Long III, Federal Unfair 
Competition: Lanham Act S 43(a) S 2.02[6] (2000) 
("Defendant's attempts to establish trademark rights . . . 
does not state a Section 43(a) violation, nor are efforts by 
defendant to obtain fraudulent registrations redressable 
under Section 43(a).") 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false 
       designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or 
false 
       or misleading representation of fact, which-- 
 
       (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive as 
       to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with 
       another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of 
his 
       or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, 
or 
 
       (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the 
       nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or 
her 
       or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities, 
 
       shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that 
he 
       or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. 
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Count three asserted a claim under Section 38 of the 
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1120,4 which imposes civil liability 
for damages sustained by a person injured as a result of 
the procurement of the registration of a mark by a false or 
fraudulent declaration. Count three alleged that the 
defendants had obtained registration of their trademarks by 
filing papers that they knew were false or fraudulent. 
 
Count four, which was based on Sections 14 and 37 of 
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. SS 1064 and 1119, 5 sought 
cancellation of the defendants' marks, as well as other 
relief, and count five, which was grounded on Section 34 of 
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1116,6  sought an injunction 
against further violations of Section 43. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Section 38 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1120, provides as follows: 
 
       Any person who shall procure registration in the Patent and 
       Trademark Office of a mark by a false or fraudulent declaration or 
       representation, oral or in writing, or by any false means, shall be 
       liable in a civil action by any person injured thereby for any 
       damages sustained in consequence thereof. 
 
5. Section 14 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1064, provides in pertinent 
part as follows: 
 
       A petition to cancel a registration of a mark, stating the grounds 
       relied upon, may, upon payment of the prescribed fee, be filed as 
       follows by any person who believes that he is or will be damaged, 
       including as a result of dilution under section 1125(c) of this 
title, 
       by the registration of a mark on the principal register established 
by 
       this chapter, or under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of 
       February 20, 1905. . . . 
 
The statute then goes on to specify, among other things, when such a 
petition must be filed. 
 
Section 37 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1119, provides as follows: 
 
       In any action involving a registered mark the court may determine 
       the right to registration, order the cancelation of registrations, 
in 
       whole or in part, restore canceled registrations, and otherwise 
rectify 
       the register with respect to the registrations of any party to the 
       action. Decrees and orders shall be certified by the court to the 
       Director, who shall make appropriate entry upon the records of the 
       Patent and Trademark Office, and shall be controlled thereby. 
 
6. Section 34(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.S 1116(a), provides in 
pertinent part as follows: 
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Finally, counts six and seven asserted claims under the 
Delaware Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 6 Del. 
Code SS 2531-36 et seq.7 These counts alleged that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       The several courts vested with jurisdiction of civil actions 
arising 
       under this chapter shall have power to grant injunctions, according 
       to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may 
       deem reasonable, to prevent the violation of any right of the 
       registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office 
       or to prevent a violation under subsection (a), (c), or (d) of 
section 
       1125 of this title. . . 
 
7. The provision of the Delaware Act that defines"deceptive trade 
practices," 15 Del. Code S 2532, provides in pertinent part as follows: 
 
        (a) A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the 
       course of a business, vocation, or occupation, that person: 
 
         (1) Passes off goods or services as those of another; 
 
         (2) Causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to 
       the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or 
       services; 
 
         (3) Causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to 
       affiliation, connection, or association with, or certification by, 
       another; 
 
         (4) Uses deceptive representations or designations of geographic 
       origin in connection with goods or services; 
 
         (5) Represents that goods or services have sponsorship, 
       approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or 
quantities 
       that they do not have, or that a person has a sponsorship, 
approval, 
       status, affiliation, or connection that the person does not have; 
 
         (6) Represents that goods are original or new if they are 
       deteriorated, altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, used, or 
secondhand; 
 
         (7) Represents that goods or services are of a particular 
       standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular 
style or 
       model, if they are of another; 
 
         (8) Disparages the goods, services, or business of another by 
       false or misleading representation of fact; 
 
         (9) Advertises goods or services with intent not to sell them as 
       advertised; 
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defendants' use of the Smirnoff mark and the Smirnoff 
family crest, insignia, emblem, and medals constituted 
deceptive trade practices. 
 
In its prayer for relief, the complaint sought, among other 
things, damages under the Lanham Act and treble damages 
under the Delaware Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 
a judgment declaring the defendants' marks null and void 
and an order directing that the marks be canceled, and an 
injunction prohibiting further violations of the Lanham Act 
or the Delaware Act. 
 
The defendants moved for summary judgment on all 
claims on several grounds, and the District Court 
subsequently entered an order that dismissed the 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and, in the 
alternative, granted the defendant's summary judgment 
motion in part. The Court first held that the plaintiffs had 
failed to establish the existence of an Article III case or 
controversy that was ripe for adjudication. Joint Stock, 53 
F. Supp. 2d at 703. The Court observed that "the plaintiffs 
ha[d] not meaningfully or adequately prepared to begin 
selling their SMIRNOV vodka products in the United 
States." Id. at 702. The Court also held that the plaintiffs 
lacked both constitutional and prudential standing and 
that their claims were barred by laches. Id. at 701. 
Constitutional standing was lacking, the Court concluded, 
because the plaintiffs admitted that they would not attempt 
to enter the United States market unless they prevailed in 
this litigation and, therefore, "they ha[d] not demonstrated 
that they ha[d] suffered an actual or imminent injury or 
[were] likely to suffer an injury in the future." Id. at 707. As 
for prudential standing under the Lanham Act, the Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
         (10) Advertises goods or services with intent not to supply 
       reasonably expectable public demand, unless the advertisement 
       discloses a limitation of quantity; 
 
         (11) Makes false or misleading statements of fact concerning the 
       reasons for, existence of, or amounts of, price reductions; or 
 
         (12) Engages in any other conduct which similarly creates a 
       likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding. 
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held that the plaintiffs' injuries were not the type that were 
intended to be redressed by Section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act, that their injuries were indirect and speculative, and 
that the risk of duplicative damages was too great. Id. at 
708-11. In addition, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs 
did not have standing under Sections 37 and 38 of the 
Lanham Act or the Delaware Act, and that Section 14 of the 
Lanham Act does not authorize cancellation of a mark by a 
court but instead applies only to the Patent and Trademark 
Office. Id. at 711-12 & n.16. Finally, the Court held that, 
even if the plaintiffs' claims were ripe and they had 
standing, the Court would nevertheless grant the 
defendant's summary judgment motion on the basis of 
laches. Id. at 712. The Court cited the failure of the French 
Smirnovs to take any action to alert Kunett or Heublein of 
their claims, and the Court concluded that the defendants 
would suffer great "economic prejudice" and"evidentiary 
prejudice" if the case were now allowed to proceed. Id. at 
717-21. 
 
On appeal, the plaintiffs contest the dismissal of all their 
claims except those under Section 38 of the Lanham Act. 
See Reply Brief at 30 n.13. They argue that, contrary to the 
decision of the District Court, they satisfied the 
requirements of Article III, their case is ripe, they have 





We turn first to the requirements of Article III of the 
Constitution. Article III, section 1 confers upon the federal 
courts "[t]he judicial Power of the United States," and 
Article III, Section 2 provides that this power extends to 
specified categories of "Cases" and "Controversies." As a 
result, " `[t]he existence of a case and [or] controversy is a 
prerequisite to all federal actions.' " Philadelphia Fed'n of 
Teachers v. Ridge, 150 F.3d 319, 322-23 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(quoting Presbytery of N.J. of Orthodox Presbyterian Church 
v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1462 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 
The Article III case-or-controversy requirement includes 
ripeness and standing requirements. See Clinton v. City of 
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New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429 & n. 15 (1998) (standing); 
Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers, 150 F.3d at 322-323 & n.3 
(ripeness). These two doctrines are related and to some 
degree overlap. Pic-A-State PA Inc. v. Reno, 76 F.3d 1294, 
1298 n.1 (3d Cir. 1996); Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. 
Adams, 961 F.2d 405, 411 n.13 (3d Cir. 1992). We have 
said that "[w]hereas ripeness is concerned with when an 
action may be brought, standing focuses on who  may bring 
an action." Pic-A-State, 76 F.3d at 1298 n.1 (emphasis in 
original); see also Presbytery of N.J., 40 F.3d at 1462; 
Armstrong World Indus., 961 F.2d at 411 n.13. But as 
noted in Lee v. Oregon, 207 F.3d 1382, 1387-88 (9th Cir. 
1997): 
 
       The overlap between these concepts has led some legal 
       commentators to suggest that the doctrines are often 
       indistinguishable. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, A 
       Unified Approach to Justiciability, 22 Conn. L. Rev. 
       1139, 677, 681 (1990). And, in "measuring whether the 
       litigant has asserted an injury that is real and concrete 
       rather than speculative and hypothetical, the ripeness 
       inquiry merges almost completely with standing." Gene 
       R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution , 54 U. Chi. 
       L. Rev. 153, 172 (1987). 
 
Although the Article III issues in this case could be 
addressed under either doctrine, we find it preferable to do 
so under the doctrine of standing. 
 
In considering whether the plaintiffs meet the standing 
requirements of Article III, we will focus on the plaintiffs' 
Section 43(a) and Delaware-law claims. Although the 
plaintiffs, as noted, also asserted claims under Sections 14, 
34, 37, and 38 of the Lanham Act, the plaintiffs do not 
contest the grant of summary judgment against them on 
their Section 38 claim, see Reply Brief at 30 n.13, and they 
take the position that their standing with respect to their 
Section 14, 34, and 37 claims is dependent on their 
standing with respect to the Section 43(a) claims. See Brief 
for Appellants at 49; Reply Brief at 29-30. Thus, our 
current discussion is confined to the plaintiffs' standing to 
litigate their claims under Section 43(a) and the Delaware 
Act. 
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The doctrine of standing incorporates both a 
constitutional element and a non-constitutional, 
"prudential" element. See The Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 
354, 359 (3d Cir. 2000); Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, 
Inc. v. Mirage Resorts, Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 484 (3d Cir. 
1998). Constitutional standing is a threshold issue that we 
should address before examining issues of prudential 
standing and statutory interpretation. See Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998); 
Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 
F.3d 221, 224 (3d Cir. 1998). The question of the plaintiffs' 
prudential standing under the Lanham Act and the 
Delaware Uniform Trade Practices Act will be taken up in 
Parts IV and V. 
 
Constitutional standing "is the `irreducible constitutional 
minimum' of standing." Trump Hotels, 140 F.3d at 484 
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 
(1992)). Constitutional standing has three elements, all of 
which must be met: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an 
injury in fact; (2) there must be a causal nexus between 
that injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) it must 
be likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
judicial decision. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61; Pitt News, 
215 F.3d at 359-361; Trump Hotels, 140 F.3d at 484-85; 
Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 225. "These requirements ensure 
that plaintiffs have a `personal stake' or `interest' in the 
outcome of the proceedings, `sufficient to warrant . . . [their] 
invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify 
exercise of the court's remedial powers on . . .[their] 
behalf.' " Wheeler v. Travelers Ins. Co. , 22 F.3d 534, 537-38 
(3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975)). "The party invoking federal 
jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing [these] 
elements." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. Furthermore, when 
standing is called into question at the summary judgment 
stage, as it was in this case, the plaintiff cannot rely on 
mere allegations "but must `set forth' by affidavit or other 
evidence `specific facts,' Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e), which for 
purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to 
be true." Id. 
 
The plaintiffs in the case before us claim that they have 
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suffered or are suffering seven injuries due to the 
defendants' illegal conduct. These are: (1) the barrier to 
entry into the United States vodka market "erected by 
Defendants' false advertising, false designation of origin, 
and illegally obtained trademarks"; (2) the plaintiffs' 
"inability to enter into distribution contracts in the United 
States"; (3) their "inability to control the use of the name 
and designations of their predecessor"; (4) the loss of the 
royalties from the defendants' "unauthorized and false 
association with P.A. Smirnov"; (5) "the inevitable and 
imminent" denial by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms ("BATF ") of plaintiffs' application for a permit to 
import vodka with the Smirnov label";8  (6) the harm to their 
ability to compete "arising from public misperceptions 
about Defendants' vodka caused by their false advertising 
and designation of origin"; and (7) the plaintiffs' inability to 
issue press releases in the United States without being 
sued by the defendants. See Brief for Appellants at 26-27. 
 
In analyzing whether any of the plaintiffs' seven putative 
injuries suffice for constitutional standing, we start by 
noting that these harms are susceptible to one of two 
characterizations, both of which the plaintiffs have 
employed at various times during this appeal: Under the 
first characterization, these asserted injuries are not 
dependent on the plaintiffs' inability to use the Smirnov 
name in this country; under the second, these injuries are 
dependent on the plaintiffs' ability to use that name. It is 
worth noting, however, that the exact characterization of 
the plaintiffs' injuries is not dispositive of the constitutional 
standing issue because, under either characterization, we 
believe that the plaintiffs have failed to establish Article III 
standing. 
 
Under the first characterization, the plaintiffs' injury is 
unrelated to their asserted rights to the Smirnoff or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. It is unlawful to import distilled spirits without a "basic permit" 
issued 
by the Secretary of the Treasury. 27 U.S.C. S 203(a)(1). As the plaintiffs 
note (Brief for Appellants at 37), if they applied for a "basic permit" to 
import vodka with the Smirnov name, it is likely that the application 
would be rejected due to the defendants' registered trademarks. See 27 
U.S.C. SS 204(a)(2)(C), 205(e). 
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Smirnov name. Put another way, the defendants' allegedly 
false advertising and false designation of origin harms the 
plaintiffs in the same way in which it harms other vodka 
manufacturers. For instance, the defendants' putatively 
false or misleading depiction of their vodka as a Russian 
product with a considerable historical pedigree may 
influence consumers to purchase Smirnoff vodka when, all 
other things being equal, those consumers would ordinarily 
have selected another brand. Under this set of facts, the 
defendants' allegedly false advertising harms the plaintiffs 
by channeling consumers toward the Smirnoff brand, but 
every other vodka manufacturer experiences the same type 
of injury. Moreover, one of the core injuries asserted by the 
plaintiffs is their inability to enter the United States vodka 
market due to the defendants' false advertising; this is the 
gravamen of harms (1), (2), and (6) listed above. Again, 
however, under the first characterization of the plaintiffs' 
injuries, this type of injury is not unique to the plaintiffs. 
Just as the allegedly false advertising may have impeded 
the plaintiffs' ability to enter the United States market-- 
e.g., by diverting vodka consumers with a preference for 
Russian brands to Smirnoff vodka, and away from other 
genuine Russian-made vodka--it would have had a 
similarly negative impact on the ability of all other Russian 
vodka manufacturers seeking to export their product to the 
United States. 
 
We believe that the plaintiffs' putative injuries, when 
characterized in this manner, do not suffice for Article III 
standing. At this summary judgment stage, plaintiffs have 
failed to create a genuine issue that they have suffered an 
injury in fact for the simple reason that the plaintiffs have 
never marketed any vodka in the United States and have 
not adduced any evidence establishing that they are 
prepared at this time to sell any vodka in this country 
without using the Smirnov name. The defendants' allegedly 
false advertising cannot have harmed the plaintiffs by 
channeling their customers toward Smirnoff when the 
plaintiffs have not even begun offering their product for sale 
in the United States. 
 
Importantly, as the plaintiffs' counsel acknowledged at 
oral argument, the plaintiffs could have asserted their false 
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advertising and false designation of origin claims even if 
they had marketed their vodka in the United States not 
under the Smirnov brand, but under a totally unrelated 
name. For instance, the plaintiffs could have renamed their 
product "Muscovy vodka," and exported it for sale in the 
United States under that name. The defendants' use of the 
Smirnoff marks would not have posed any formal obstacle 
to entry--e.g., the denial of a basic permit from the BATF, 
see supra note 8, or the possibility of a trademark 
infringement suit initiated by the defendants--because the 
plaintiffs' vodka would have been offered for sale under a 
mark that would not be likely to create confusion with the 
defendants' existing Smirnoff marks. 
 
In this case, however, the plaintiffs have insisted on 
entering the United States vodka market only under the 
Smirnov mark. If the plaintiffs had shipped even a small 
amount of Russian vodka to this country for sale under a 
different name, they likely would have established a 
sufficient injury in fact. All that the Article III's injury-in- 
fact element requires is "an identifiable trifle" of harm, 
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Action 
Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973), which 
presumably could have been met by showing that some 
consumers who bought the defendants' product under the 
mistaken belief that is was of Russian origin and carried a 
notable pedigree would have otherwise bought the plaintiffs' 
product. Similarly, if the plaintiffs were poised to ship 
vodka to this country under a name other than Smirnov, 
they might have been able to show that they faced a 
sufficiently "imminent" threat of injury to satisfy the injury- 
in-fact requirement. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. But as 
things now stand, any future diminution of sales in this 
country, or any potential barrier to entering the United 
States vodka market, is "conjectural" or "hypothetical," 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 
U.S. 149, 155 (1990), since the plaintiffs have not 
expressed an intention to ship vodka here unless they are 
able to use the Smirnov name. Thus, the first 
characterization of the plaintiffs' putative injury does not 
yield constitutional standing, as Article III's injury-in-fact 
requirement is not satisfied. 
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We turn, therefore, to the second characterization of the 
plaintiffs' asserted injuries--i.e., one that is dependent on 
the plaintiffs' inability to use the Smirnov name in the 
United States in connection with their vodka. Under this 
second, alternative characterization of the plaintiffs' 
asserted injury, the plaintiffs have suffered a harm due to 
their unique claim to the Smirnoff or Smirnov name and 
marks. Put another way, the core of the plaintiffs' claim 
here is that they possess superior rights to Smirnoff marks, 
and that the defendants have interfered with and 
appropriated the benefits of those superior rights by 
employing those marks in the United States vodka market. 
This appears to be the logic behind harms (3), (4), (5), and 
(7). Moreover, one can characterize harms (1) and (2) in this 
fashion: The defendants' use of the Smirnoff marks in the 
United States market has created a specific barrier to entry 
to the plaintiffs' brand, since the threat of a trademark 
infringement suit (and the denial of a basic permit) prevents 
the plaintiffs from entering into distribution contracts and 
selling their vodka in the United States under the 
confusingly-similar Smirnov name. 
 
Although the plaintiffs' asserted harms, when 
characterized in this second fashion, would likely satisfy 
the injury-in-fact requirement, we believe that the plaintiffs 
lack Article III standing because there is no "causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct complained 
of," Trump Hotels, 140 F.3d at 485 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. 
at 560-61). Under this second characterization,"the 
conduct complained of "--i.e., the defendants' allegedly false 
and misleading misrepresentation of their vodka as a 
Russian product once manufactured by P.A. Smirnov and 
sold to the Russian imperial family--is not the cause of the 
core injury claimed by the plaintiffs--i.e., their inability to 
use the Smirnov names in the United States vodka market. 
Rather, it is the defendants' prior use of the marks in the 
United States market. This use spanned several decades, 
involved hundreds of millions of dollars in expenditures, 
and resulted in the creation of considerable goodwill 
associated with the Smirnoff brand. 
 
To be sure, the plaintiffs could (and do) claim that they 
had rights to the Smirnov and Smirnoff marks superior to 
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that of the defendants (presumably, through the plaintiffs' 
association with the French Smirnovs, who claim a right to 
the Smirnoff marks through Eugenia). The typical vehicle 
for asserting such a claim is a trademark infringement 
action. If this were a trademark infringement suit, then the 
Article III causal connection would most likely be present, 
as the "the conduct complained of "--i.e., the defendants' 
infringing use of the plaintiffs' marks--would have directly 
caused the plaintiffs' putative injury. In this case, however, 
the plaintiffs have stressed that they are not  bringing a 
trademark infringement suit, but rather an action for false 
advertising and false designation of origin. See Appellant's 
Brief at 4. Viewed as part of a false advertising suit, the 
plaintiffs' putative injuries simply lack the requisite causal 
connection to the defendants' allegedly false advertising. 
Suppose, for example, that the labels of the defendants' 
products and promotions made it perfectly clear that their 
Smirnoff vodka was made in the United States using 
American ingredients and an entirely new American recipe 
and method not endorsed by the original P.A. Smirnov or 
the French Smirnovs. It is doubtful that the plaintiffs would 
have a basis for their Section 43(a) or Delaware deceptive 
trade practices claims; the defendants' marketing would be, 
after all, neither false nor misleading. Nonetheless, the 
plaintiffs ability to enter the United States market under 
the Smirnov name would be no greater than it is now, due 
to the fact that the defendants have employed and continue 
to employ an established set of marks associated with the 
Smirnoff name in that market. Consequently, it is apparent 
that, under this second characterization, the plaintiffs' 
putative injuries are not "fairly traceable to the challenged 
action of the defendant[s]," but are rather the result of an 
independent cause. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; see also Simon 
v. Easter Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 
(1976). 
 
Thus, we conclude that, under either of the two 
alternative characterizations of the plaintiffs' injuries, the 
plaintiffs lack Article III standing to litigate their Section 
43(a) and their Delaware deceptive trade practices claims.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In their reply brief, the plaintiffs offer another theory for their 
Article 
III standing to bring the false advertising and false designation of 
origin 
 





Moreover, even if the plaintiffs' Section 43(a) claims meet 
the standing requirements of Article III, they cannot satisfy 
the demands of prudential standing. "Prudential standing 
`consists of a set of judge-made rules forming an integral 
part of "judicial self-government.' "" Gen. Instrument Corp. of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
claims. The plaintiffs argue that they possess a"right of association" 
with the original P.A. Smirnov (a right originally held by Eugenia, then 
passed through descent to Boris Alexandrovitch Smirnov, and finally 
transferred by Boris to the plaintiffs), independent of any common law 
trademark rights in the Smirnoff or Smirnov name or marks, and that 
the defendants' false advertising has caused the plaintiffs injury by 
interfering with this right of association. 
 
For support, the plaintiffs analogize this case to Cairns v. Franklin Mint 
Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (C.D. Cal. 1998), aff 'd, 1999 WL 12780044 
(9th Cir. 2000), in which a District Court held that the executors of the 
estate of the late Princess Diana stated a claim under Section 43(a) for 
false celebrity endorsement against the Franklin Mint and others who 
sold merchandise (such as porcelain dolls, rings, and plates) that bore 
Princess Diana's likeness or name. The district court understood the 
plaintiffs' chief argument to be that the defendants' use of the likeness 
and name was likely to lead consumers to believe that the executors 
were endorsing the defendants' products, and held that the executors 
had standing in their own right to bring their Section 43(a) claim against 
the defendants. See id. at 1032-33. 
 
Because the plaintiffs in the present case did not develop this 
argument until their reply brief, we do not regard it as properly before 
us. See Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am. v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 
375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994)("An issue is waived unless a party raises it in 
its 
opening brief. . . ."). But even if it were before us, it would not 
persuade 
us that the plaintiffs have standing. Even were we to assume arguendo 
that the plaintiffs possessed such "right of association" with P.A. 
Smirnov, and that the defendants' allegedly false advertising interfered 
with that right by preventing the plaintiffs from using the Smirnov or 
Smirnoff name and marks in the United States market, we would still 
conclude that the plaintiffs failed to establish the requisite causal 
connection between the plaintiffs' asserted injury and the defendants' 
challenged conduct. The plaintiffs have not pointed to evidence that is 
sufficient to show that they would be able to market their vodka in the 
United States under the Smirnov name were it not for the consuming 
public's mistaken belief, fostered by the defendants' false advertising, 
that either the plaintiffs (or P.A. Smirnov, or the French Smirnovs) 
endorsed the defendants' product. 
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Del. v. Nu-Tek Elecs. & Mfg., Inc., 197 F.3d 83, 87 (3d Cir. 
1999) (quoting Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 225). The 
requirements of prudential standing serve "to avoid 
deciding questions of broad social import where no 
individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access to 
the federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert a 
particular claim." Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 225 (quoting 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985)). 
 
"Where Congress has expressly conferred standing by 
statute, prudential standing concerns are superseded." 
Gen. Instrument, 197 F.3d at 87 (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 
501). However, "Congress is presumed to incorporate 
background prudential standing principles, unless the 
statute expressly negates them." Conte Bros. , 165 F.3d at 
227 (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164 (1997)). 
Here, these "background prudential standing principles" 
apply, since "Congress did not expressly negate[the] 
prudential standing doctrine in passing the Lanham Act." 
Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 227. 
 
In Thorn v. Reliance Van Co., 736 F.2d 929 (3d Cir. 
1984), we addressed Section 43(a)'s prudential standing 
requirements for the first time. We held that a party has 
prudential standing to bring a claim under Section 43(a) if 
the "party has a reasonable interest to be protected against 
false advertising." Thorn, 736 F.2d at 933. In later cases, we 
"grappled with defining the term [reasonable interest] with 
greater precision." Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 231; see, e.g., 
PDK Labs., Inc. v. Friedlander, 103 F.3d 1105, 1111 (3d Cir. 
1991) (applying a two-pronged reasonableness test for 
S 43(a) prudential standing). 
 
In Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 233, we adopted the test for 
antitrust standing articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. 
California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983) 
[hereinafter, AGC]. Under this test, a court called upon to 
decide whether a party has prudential standing under 
Section 43(a) should consider the following factors: 
 
       (1) The nature of the plaintiff 's alleged injury, i.e., is 
       the injury of a type that Congress sought to redress in 
       providing a private remedy for violations of the Lanham 
       Act? 
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       (2) The directness or indirectness of the asserted 
       injury. 
 
       (3) The proximity or remoteness of the party to the 
       alleged injurious conduct. 
 
       (4) The speculativeness of the damages claim. 
 
       (5) The risk of duplicative damages or complexity in 
       apportioning damages. 
 
Id. at 233 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Unisource 
Worldwide, Inc. v. Heller, No. Civ. A. 99-266, 1999 WL 
374180, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 9, 1999) (applying the Conte 
Bros. test); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 80 F. 
Supp. 2d 639, 678-81 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (same). Courts have 
applied the AGC test on a case-by-case basis, weighing the 
enumerated factors without giving any one factor 
determinative weight. See Sullivan v. Tagliabue , 25 F.3d 43, 
46 (1st Cir. 1994); Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum v. NFL, 791 
F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1986). After examining and 
weighing these five factors, we hold that the plaintiffs lack 





Section 43(a) is intended to provide a private remedy "to 
a commercial plaintiff who meets the burden of proving that 
its commercial interests have been harmed by a 
competitor's false advertising." Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l Corp., 
11 F.3d 1163, 1175 (3d Cir. 1993). This is not to say that 
a non-competitor never has standing to sue under this 
provision; rather, the focus is on protecting "commercial 
interests that have been harmed by a competitor's false 
advertising," Granite State Ins. Co. v. Aamco Transmissions, 
Inc., 57 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 1995), and "secur[ing] to the 
business community the advantages of reputation and good 
will by preventing their diversion from those who have 
created them to those who have not." Conte Bros., 165 F.3d 
at 234 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275). 
 
In our treatment of constitutional standing, we listed and 
discussed the numerous forms of injury that the plaintiffs 
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claim to have suffered, and as we noted, those various 
injuries may be characterized in two ways -- those injuries 
that are and those that are not dependent on the plaintiffs' 
inability to use the Smirnov name. We previously pointed 
out that the injuries in the former characterization are not 
"fairly traceable" to the conduct on the part of the 
defendants that forms the basis for the plaintiffs' Section 
43(a) claims -- the allegedly false designation of origin and 
false advertising. 
 
The plaintiffs, however, rely heavily on injuries of this 
type to support their argument that the first factor of the 
Conte Bros. test weighs in their favor. The plaintiffs 
complain that they cannot obtain BATF approval for a 
vodka label using the Smirnov name and symbols. Brief for 
Appellants at 32. However, the plaintiffs predict that the 
BATF will reject this label "because it would infringe 
Defendants' registered trademarks." Brief for Appellants at 
37. Under the first factor of the Conte Bros.  test, we must 
look for an injury that "flows from that which makes 
defendants' acts unlawful." See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo 
Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (An "antitrust injury" 
must "flow[ ] from that which makes defendants' acts 
unlawful."). Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act seeks to 
protect parties against false designation of origin and false 
advertising. Accordingly, we must look for an injury that 
was caused by a false designation of origin or false 
advertising. For this reason, the plaintiffs' purported injury 
involving the BATF is insufficient to satisfy the first factor 
of the Conte Bros. test. 
 
The plaintiffs also claim that they are unable to enter into 
distribution contracts or to advertise their products, but it 
is apparent that these injuries too result largely, if not 
entirely, from the defendants' marks and not from their 
alleged false designation of origin or false advertising. The 
plaintiffs have not identified evidence showing that their 
supposed complete inability to enter into distribution 
contracts or advertise results from the defendants' false 
association with the original Smirnov trade house or false 
advertising. On the contrary, the plaintiffs themselves state 
that distributors have refused to enter into contracts with 
Joint Stock "for fear of being sued by the Defendants" for 
trademark infringement. Brief for Appellants at 36. 
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The plaintiffs do allege at least one injury of the type that 
Section 43(a) is intended to protect. The plaintiffs state: 
 
       Companies such as Plaintiffs that manufacture and 
       distribute Russian vodka are uniquely injured by 
       Defendants' false advertising and designations of 
       origin. The evidence shows that Defendants' 
       wrongdoing has caused consumers to perceive 
       SMIRNOFF vodka to be a Russian product. Any 
       deceived customers who seek to buy Russian vodka are 
       likely to mistakenly purchase Defendants' product only 
       to the detriment of companies like Plaintiffs, which 
       produce true Russian vodka. 
 
Brief for Appellants at 33-34. The plaintiffs correctly note 
that this injury is "irrespective of their rights to the 
SMIRNOV name and heritage." See Brief for Appellants at 
33. But as we have already discussed, we do not believe 
that the plaintiffs have shown that they have actually 
suffered injury of this type or that they face an imminent 
threat of such injury because the plaintiffs have never 
manifested an intent to offer their products for sale in the 
United States market other than under the Smirnov name. 
 
Nevertheless, even if our prior conclusion were incorrect 
and the plaintiffs had shown at least an "identifiable trifle" 
of this sort of injury or a sufficient threat of such an injury 
to satisfy the constitutional requirement of injury in fact, it 
would not necessarily follow that they have prudential 
standing as well. Just as "[a]ntitrust injury is a necessary 
but insufficient condition of antitrust standing," Barton & 
Pittinos, Inc. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 118 F.3d 178, 
182 (3d Cir. 1997), the existence of a minimal Lanham Act 
injury does not alone support a finding of standing. Rather, 
we must weigh this injury with the other four factors of the 




Under the second factor of the Conte Bros. test, we 
examine the directness or indirectness of the asserted 
injury. See Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 234. The issue under 
this factor is whether the defendants' conduct has had a 
direct effect on either the plaintiffs or the market in which 
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they participate. See AGC, 459 U.S. at 540-41; Sullivan, 25 
F.3d at 51 (examining the directness factor under AGC). 
 
The plaintiffs provided some evidence that the 
defendants' designation of origin and advertising may have 
had an adverse impact on Russian vodka producers. There 
is no doubt that the labels that the defendants affix to their 
products evoke Russia and could convey the impression 
that the defendants' vodka is the same as or similar to the 
vodka that was purveyed to the Russian court and won 
international competitions prior to the revolution. J.A. at 
659 & 708 & 711 (Smirnoff labels). In addition, the 
plaintiffs submitted a study showing that only 37% of 
American vodka drinkers identify Smirnoff as an American 
brand, while 23% of vodka drinkers believe that Smirnoff is 
made in Russia. Moreover, the study found that 27% of 
Smirnoff drinkers believe that it is a Russian brand, while 
only 33% of sub-premium vodka drinkers can correctly 
identify Smirnoff as an American label. J.A. at 3116. This 
evidence could support a finding that the defendants have 
misled consumers regarding the origin and nature of their 
products and have detracted from the "reputation or good 
will" of importers of Russian vodka. See Conte Bros., 165 
F.3d at 234. 
 
As noted, however, the plaintiffs have not and do not 
import Russian vodka and apparently do not intend to do 
so unless they are able to use the Smirnov mark. While an 
importer of Russian vodka could claim that the defendants' 
activities directly lowered its sales and profits, the plaintiffs' 
position is more attenuated. They complain that the 
defendants' false designation of origin and false advertising 
have made the American market less profitable for 
importers of Russian vodka; that this has made distributors 
less willing to import Joint Stock's product; and that this 
has contributed to Joint Stock's failure to send any vodka 
to the United States. Seen in this light, Joint Stock's injury 
is not direct enough to weigh in favor of prudential 




The third factor is the proximity of the plaintiff to the 
allegedly harmful conduct. See Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 
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233. Our task here is to determine whether there is"an 
identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would 
normally motivate [them] to vindicate the public interest" by 
bringing an enforcement action. AGC, 459 U.S. at 542; 
accord Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 234. The existence of such 
a class "diminishes the justification for allowing a more 
remote party . . . to perform the office of a private attorney 
general." AGC, 459 U.S. at 542. 
 
Russian vodka manufacturers who are currently 
exporting their products to the United States form such an 
identifiable class, and all manufacturers currently selling 
vodka products in the United States constitute another 
such class. Both of these groups of manufacturers are more 
proximate to the claimed injury here, which has occurred in 
the American vodka market. 
 
The Second Circuit faced a similar situation in Havana 
Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 203 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 
2000). There, a Cuban manufacturer of rum, Havana Club 
Holding, S.A. ("HCH"), filed suit against Bacardi & Co. 
("Bacardi"), the American manufacturer of"Havana Club" 
rum. HCH claimed that Bacardi falsely designated its rum's 
origin as Cuban. However, HCH did not compete with 
Bacardi in the United States because of the Cuban trade 
embargo. In holding that HCH did not have standing to 
pursue its Lanham Act claims, the Second Circuit relied in 
part on the ability of "[a]ny rum producer selling its product 
in the United States" to "obtain standing to complain about 
Bacardi's allegedly false designation of origin." Havana 
Club, 203 F.3d at 134. Similarly, in this case, any vodka 
producer selling its products in the United States could 
challenge the defendants' activities and would have a 
stronger commercial interest to protect than do the 
defendants, making it more appropriate for them to act as 
"private attorney generals."10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. In weighing this factor, we do not impose a requirement that 
plaintiffs "be United States competitors to have standing," as the 
plaintiffs misconstrue the District Court's opinion as holding. Compare 
Brief for Appellants at 42 with Joint Stock Soc'y, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 710. 
Rather, we take into account the premise implicit in the AGC and Conte 
Bros. test that a direct competitor will usually have a stronger 
commercial interest than a non-competitor. 
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We realize that the plaintiffs have taken some steps in 
preparation for possibly marketing Joint Stock's products 
in this country. Joint Stock has organized RASCO as the 
exclusive licensee and distributor of its vodka in the United 
States and has hired a market consultant. Joint Stock has 
also issued a press release, created a label, and solicited 
contracts. The plaintiffs argue that they cannot take further 
steps to enter the market because of the very activity that 
they seek to enjoin. However, the plaintiffs again confuse 
injuries traceable to the defendants' marks with injuries 
traceable to the defendants' alleged false designation of 
origin and false advertising. As we have observed, according 
to the plaintiffs, distributors refuse to enter into contracts 
with Joint Stock because they fear being sued by the 
defendants for trademark infringement. See Brief for 
Appellants at 36. Joint Stock could presumably circumvent 
this problem by simply importing vodka into the United 
States under a different name. Thus, faulting Joint Stock 
because it is not more closely associated with the American 
market is not, as the plaintiffs claim, "ask[ing] Plaintiffs to 




The fourth factor, the speculative nature of the plaintiffs' 
damages, also weighs against prudential standing. Because 
the plaintiffs have never sold or attempted to sell their 
vodka in the United States, any attempt to calculate lost 
sales or profits would be highly speculative. 
 
Attempting to circumvent this problem, the plaintiffs 
assert that they advanced the following three theories of 
damages that would not have required speculation: (1) a 
reasonable royalty for the defendants' use of the Smirnov 
name since 1939; (2) the costs of a corrective advertising 
campaign; and (3) disgorgement of the defendants' profits 
since 1982. See Brief for Appellants at 42. We do not agree 
that the plaintiffs' request for these forms of relief causes 
the fourth factor to weigh in their favor. 
 
First, it is not clear that an award of royalties for the use 
of the Smirnov name since 1939 would be a proper remedy 
for the false designation of origin and false advertising 
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claims that the plaintiffs asserted under Section 43(a). In 
every case cited by the plaintiffs in which royalties were 
awarded, the owner of a patent or trademark sued for 
infringement. See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats 
Co., 34 F.3d 1340, 1351 (7th Cir. 1994) (trademark 
infringement); Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats 
Co., 978 F.2d 947, 964 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); Proctor & 
Gamble Co. v. Paragon Trade Brands, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 
547, 607-14 (D. Del. 1997) (patent infringement). Moreover, 
in their briefs on appeal, the plaintiffs have made little 
attempt to show that they have a right to the use of the 
Smirnov or Smirnoff marks in this country. The plaintiffs 
have not attempted to answer the defendants' argument 
that trademark rights are territorial; that, whatever rights 
the plaintiffs and the French Smirnovs may have to use the 
family name elsewhere, they have never had any trademark 
rights in this country; and that even if they had trademark 
rights in this country prior to the Russian Revolution,11 
those rights were long ago abandoned. 
 
As for the remaining theories of damages -- disgorgement 
of profits and the cost of a corrective advertising campaign 
-- it appears that any party with standing could request 
these forms of relief. Disgorgement of profits "initially 
developed as a remedy to provide a plaintiff with relief in 
equity, to serve as a proxy for damages, or to deter the 
wrongdoer from continuing his violations" and"is most 
appropriate if damages are otherwise nominal." BASF Corp. 
v. Old World Trading Co., 41 F.3d 1081, 1095-96 (7th Cir. 
1994); see also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Baccarat Clothing 
Co., 692 F.2d 1272, 1274 (9th Cir. 1982). Similarly, a 
corrective advertising campaign could presumably be 
sought by any party no matter how situated. 
 
If a request for relief that may be sought by any party 
sufficed under the fourth factor of the Conte Bros. test, that 
factor would be essentially meaningless, and we refuse to 
undermine the fourth factor in this way. "The aim of 
[prudential standing] is to determine whether the plaintiff is 
`a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. There is some evidence that P.A. Smirnov's trade house shipped a 
small quantity of vodka to New York before 1917. 
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and the exercise of the court's remedial powers." Conte 
Bros., 165 F.3d at 225 (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area 
Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 546 n.8 (1986)) (emphasis added); see 
Roger D. Blair & William H. Page, "Speculative" Antitrust 
Damages, 70 Wash. L. Rev. 423, 425 (1995) (noting that 
the doctrine of antitrust standing requires an effective 
mechanism for the proof of individual harm). Therefore, we 
agree with the District Court that the plaintiffs may not 
bolster their case for prudential standing by relying on 
forms of monetary relief that they would receive"as a 
`vicarious avenger' of the general public's right to be 
protected against potentially false advertisements." Joint 
Stock, 53 F. Supp. at 710 (citing Serbin, 11 F.3d at 1175). 
 
The damages that we examine under this factor are those 
that are particular to the plaintiffs. For example, a plaintiff 
often will point to its own reduction in sales or loss of 
profits. See Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 234; Johnson & 
Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 190 (2d Cir. 
1980) (holding that a Lanham Act plaintiff must show a 
likelihood of damages from loss of sales). The only damages 
of that nature that the plaintiffs in this case could claim 
would be extremely speculative -- namely, the profits that 
Joint Stock would have made if it had sold its vodka in the 
United States without using the Smirnov name and had not 
faced the defendants' allegedly false designation of origin 
and false advertising. For this reason, the fourth factor 




The final factor under Conte Bros. is the risk of 
duplicative damages or the complexity of apportioning 
damages. Damage claims such as those advanced by the 
plaintiffs may be asserted by at least three groups. Ranked 
in descending order of proximity to the allegedly unlawful 
conduct, these groups are: (1) all importers of Russian 
vodka currently doing business in the United States; (2) all 
other vodka manufacturers in the American market; and (3) 
all manufacturers of vodka (including makers of Russian 
vodka) who, like the plaintiffs, have not entered the United 
States market but have taken at least minimal preparatory 
steps for entry. Due to the speculative nature of the 
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damages of parties in the third group, allowing them to sue 
would create a danger of duplicative damages and thus 
potentially "would subject defendant firms to multiple 
liability for the same conduct and would result in 
administratively complex damages proceedings." Conte 
Bros., 165 F.3d at 235. Although the plaintiffs correctly 
note that in Conte Bros. we were disinclined to grant 
standing to remote parties along the vertical distribution 
chain, see Brief for Appellants at 46-47, we see no reason 
why similar concerns should not apply in the admittedly 




To summarize, the plaintiffs may have a minimal 
commercial interest, but they have at best only a very 
indirect injury. In addition, they are remote from the 
asserted injury, their damages claims are highly 
speculative, and there is a substantial risk of duplicative 
damages. The Conte Bros. factors counsel strongly against 
prudential standing. The plaintiffs argue that some of the 
Conte Bros. factors are suited for use only in considering 
claims for damages and therefore should not be taken into 
account or should be discounted in determining whether 
the plaintiffs have prudential standing with respect to their 
requests for non-monetary relief. Even if we do this, 
however, the remaining factors -- most notably, the indirect 
nature of the plaintiffs' injury and their remoteness from 
the alleged violations of Section 43(a)-- lead to the same 
result. We thus hold that the plaintiffs lack prudential 
standing to assert any of their Section 43(a) claims.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. As an alternative basis for the summary judgment grant in the 
defendants' favor, the District Court held that the plaintiffs' action was 
barred under the equitable doctrine of laches. Laches bars an action 
from proceeding if there was (1) an inexcusable delay in bringing suit, 
and (2) material prejudice to the defendant as a result of the delay. See 
Pappan Enterp. v. Hardee's Food Sys., 143 F.3d 800, 804 (3d Cir. 1998); 
accord United States Cellular Inv. Co. v. Bell Atl. Mobile Sys., Inc., 677 
A.2d 497, 502 (Del. 1996) (setting forth the same two-prong test under 
Delaware law). 
 
With respect to the inexcusable delay prong, the District Court noted 
that the French Smirnovs were aware for over sixty years that the 
 





We likewise hold that the plaintiffs lack standing under 
the Delaware Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. A 
proper plaintiff under this Act is "[a] person likely to be 
damaged by a deceptive trade practice of another." 6 Del. 
Code S 2533. The relevant Delaware case law persuades us 
that standing under this Act with respect to claims of the 
sort advanced by the plaintiffs in this case is no broader 
than prudential standing under Section 43(a). See S & R 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
defendants and their predecessors in interest were producing and selling 
vodka in the United States under the Smirnoff label, yet neither 
instituted legal action nor provided the defendants or their predecessors 
with notice that the French Smirnovs had a potential claim to the marks. 
See id. at 713-14. Furthermore, the Court rejected the excuses offered by 
the plaintiffs, namely that the French Smirnovs were too destitute, and 
too hampered by lack of available documentary evidence establishing 
their connection to the original P.A. Smirnov vodka manufacturer, to 
pursue their claims against the defendants or their predecessors. See id. 
at 715-16. Finally, with respect to the second prong of the laches test, 
the Court observed that the defendants' had suffered severe economic 
and evidentiary prejudice by the French Smirnovs' sixty-year delay. See 
id. at 717-21. 
 
On appeal, the plaintiffs seek to overcome the District Court's powerful 
analysis of the laches issue on several grounds. First, the plaintiffs 
argue 
that it was improper for the Court to impute the French Smirnovs' delay 
to the plaintiffs, because the plaintiffs are corporate entities that did 
not 
come into existence until the early to mid 1990s. Second, even assuming 
that the Court's imputation was proper, the plaintiffs argue that the 
French Smirnovs' poverty and lack of documentary evidence excuses are 
legitimate ones. Third, the plaintiffs claim that the record evidence 
raises 
a genuine issue as to whether the defendants were prejudiced by the 
sixty-year delay. Finally, the plaintiffs point to the equitable nature of 
the laches doctrine, assert that the defendants did not act in good faith 
in employing the Smirnoff marks (in fact, that they willfully set out to 
defraud and deceive the public), and argue that such alleged bad faith 
should prevent the laches bar from applying to the plaintiffs' claims. 
 
Because, for the reasons set forth in this opinion, we conclude that the 
plaintiffs lack the constitutional and prudential standing necessary to 
bring this action against the defendants, we need not reach this 
alternative bar to the plaintiffs' claims. Accordingly, we will not 
address 
the merits of the plaintiffs' challenges to the District Court's laches 
analysis. 
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Assocs., L.P., III v. Shell Oil Co., 725 A.2d 431, 440 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1998); Pack & Process, Inc. v. Celotex Corp., 503 
A.2d 646, 649 n.1 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985). Consequently, for 
the reasons already discussed, we hold that the plaintiffs 




We affirm the order of the District Court dismissing this 
case. 
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